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Could Artificial Wombs
End the Abortion Debate?
Christopher Kaczor
Although artificial wombs may seem fanciful when first considered, certain
trends suggest they may become reality. Between 1945 and the 1970s, the weight at
which premature infants could survive dropped dramatically, moving from 1000
grams to around 400 grams.1  In 1973, the U.S. Supreme Court, in deciding Roe v.
Wade, considered viability to begin around twenty-eight weeks. In 2000, premature
babies were reported to have survived at eighteen weeks.2  Advanced incubators
already in existence save thousands of children born prematurely each year. It is
highly likely that such incubators will become even more advanced as technology
progresses.
Researchers are working to make super-advanced incubators, “artificial wombs,”
a reality. Temple University professor Dr. Thomas Schaffer hopes to save premature
infants using a synthetic amniotic fluid of oxygen-rich perfluorocarbons. Lack of
funding has thus far prevented tests on human infants born prematurely, but Shaffer
has successfully transferred premature lamb fetuses from their mother’s wombs and
used the synthetic amniotic fluid to sustain their lives.3  At Cornell University, Dr.
Hung-Ching Liu has taken steps toward developing an artificial womb by removing
cells from the lining of a woman’s womb and then, using hormones, growing layers
1Bernard Nathanson and Richard Ostling, Aborting America (Toronto: Life Cycle
Books, 1979), 280–281.
2David S. Oderberg, Applied Ethics: A Non-Consequentialist Approach, (Oxford,
U.K.: Blackwell Publishers, 2000), 5.
3Sacha Zimmerman, “Fetal Position: The Real Threat to Roe v. Wade,” The New
Republic (August 18, 2003).
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of these cells on a model of a uterus. The model eventually dissolves, leaving a new
artificial womb that continues to thrive. What is more, Liu’s team found that, within
days of being placed in the new womb, embryos will attach themselves to its walls
and begin to grow. At that point, scientists must end the experiment to comply with in
vitro fertilization (IVF) laws, so researchers do not yet know how long after the
beginning stages of gestation this artificial womb would be viable.4
Liu hopes to develop these wombs so that they could be transplanted into
women with pathological or missing uteruses. If successful, the research would be a
breakthrough in helping successful implantation. At the Juntendo University in Ja-
pan, Dr. Yoshinori Kuwabara seeks to aid women facing miscarriage or very prema-
ture birth by developing an artificial uterus to enable the completion of the process of
gestation: “For the past several years, Kuwabara and his team have kept goat fetuses
alive and growing for up to ten days by connecting their umbilical cords to two
machines that serve as a placenta, pumping in blood, oxygen and nutrients and
disposing of waste products.”5
If these researchers, and others like them, are successful, what would it mean
for the abortion debate? There has been a good deal of recent speculation on this
matter,6  but none considering the writings of intellectual defenders of abortion and
none considering a distinctly Catholic perspective in terms of magisterial teaching.
If artificial wombs were made available and relatively affordable, and the pro-
cedure was no more intrusive than present-day abortion, would abortion defenders
be satisfied with extractive abortion (removing the living human fetus for implanta-
tion into an artificial womb) or would they insist on the right to terminative abortion
(ending human fetal life)? Would the use of an artificial womb in lieu of abortion be
morally permissible for consistent critics, especially Catholic critics, of abortion? Or,
has magisterial teaching or Catholic tradition excluded, if only implicitly, this prac-
tice? Depending on how these questions are answered, it could be the case that
most consistent critics of abortion and most consistent defenders of abortion could
4Ibid. See also Paula Moyer, “Engineered Endometrial Tissue May Provide New
Infertility Therapies,” Reuters Health Medical News (October 24, 2001).
5Jeremy Rifkin, “The End of Pregnancy: Within a Generation There Will Probably
Be Mass Use of Artificial Wombs to Grow Babies,” Guardian Unlimited (U.K.) (January
17, 2002), http://www.guardian.co.uk/Archive/Article/0,4273,4337092,00.html. See also
R.G. Edwards and P.C. Steptoe, “Current Status of In-Vitro Fertilisation and Implantation
of Human Embryos,” Lancet 2.8362 (December 3, 1983): 1265–1269; K.G. Gould, “Ovum
Recovery and In Vitro Fertilization in the Chimpanzee,” Fertility and Sterility 40.3 (Sep-
tember 1983): 378–383.
6In addition to the articles already cited, see Scott B. Rae, “The Advent of the Artifi-
cial Womb: A Prospect to Be Welcomed,” The Center for Bioethics and Human Dignity,
http://www.cbhd.org/resources/reproductive/rae_2003-01-29.htm; Robin McKie, “Men
Redundant? Now We Don’t Need Women Either,” The Observer (U.K.) (February 10,
2002), http://observer.guardian.co.uk/international/story/0,6903,648024,00.html; Ronald
Bailey, “Babies in a Bottle: Artificial Wombs and the Beginning of Human Life,” Reason
Online (August 20, 2003), http://www.reason.com/rb/rb082003.shtml.
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both be satisfied, and the abortion debate among intellectuals, at least as we know it
now, would change profoundly, if not altogether be ended. Needless to say, my
remarks here are necessarily “exploratory” insofar as they apply traditional moral
reasoning to an as yet nonexistent technology. It would be extremely difficult, if not
impossible, beforehand to explore in depth the political, social, economic, and theo-
logical ramifications of an artificial uterus, and yet an admittedly incomplete consid-
eration of the ethical dimensions of this possibility may better prepare us, if and
when this possibility becomes a reality.
Artificial Wombs and Consistent Defenders of Abortion
Consistent defenders of abortion believe that abortion is morally permissible in
all circumstances throughout all nine months of pregnancy. In moral and usually also
legal terms, consistent defenders of abortion assert an absolute right to abortion,
even as consistent critics of abortion defend an exceptionless norm against intention-
ally killing the human fetus.7  But what exactly is meant by the “right to abortion”?
One should distinguish two aspects of abortion that are currently but not neces-
sarily linked—extraction and termination. Abortion rights might be understood as the
right not to be pregnant, the right not to have the human fetus in the womb, the right
of extraction. On the other hand, abortion rights might be defined as the right to end
the life of the human fetus in utero, the right to terminate not just the pregnancy, but
also the life of the fetus. These two understandings of abortion, although distinct, are
at least for the present linked, since one cannot currently accomplish evacuation of
the human fetus from the uterus at an early stage of pregnancy without also termi-
nating the life of the human fetus. Accordingly, one could advocate the right of
evacuation or extraction, that is, the right to have the fetus removed from the woman’s
body, and yet not advocate a right of termination, that is, the right to have the fetus
killed within the woman’s body. The question can then be asked, When someone
defends the right to an abortion, does this include only evacuation or also termina-
tion?
Most defenders of abortion in fact only advocate a right to evacuation and not
a right to termination. For example, the American College of Obstetricians and Gyne-
cologists in 1977 wrote:
7For the record, I believe that the killing of any innocent person, including all preborn
human beings, as a means or as an end, is always ethically impermissible; see my
Proportionalism and the Natural Law Tradition (Washington, DC: The Catholic Univer-
sity of America Press, 2002). In chapters two and three of The Edge of Life: Human
Dignity and Contemporary Bioethics (New York: Springer, 2005), I reject all “performative
accounts” of personhood (e.g., functional rationality, the desire to live, sentience, viabil-
ity, what a being “does”) and argue that every single human being from the very beginning
of his or her existence, normally at conception, is a person and should be accorded due
respect. At present, I am finishing a book The Ethics of Abortion: Human Life, Women’s
Rights, and the Question of Justice, that defends this conclusion as applied to the abor-
tion issue.
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The College affirms that the resolution of such conflict (between woman and
fetus) by inducing abortion in no way implies that the physician has an adver-
sary relationship towards the fetus and therefore, the physician does not view
the destruction of the fetus as the primary purpose of abortion. The College
consequently recognizes a continuing obligation on the part of the physician
towards the survival of a possibly viable fetus where this can be discharged
without additional hazard to the health of the mother.8
If methods of nonlethal evacuation were available and safe for maternal health,
then this statement would require that doctors use these means. Artificial wombs as
envisioned are precisely the means that would enable the survival of a viable fetus
without additional hazard to the health of the mother. If all physicians abided by this
statement, this alone would dramatically change the abortion debate, for if the medi-
cal community refused to perform terminative abortions and would only perform
evacuative abortions, then the abortion debate as we know it today would be over.
Among philosophers defending abortion, the most prominent, such as Mary
Ann Warren, Judith Jarvis Thomson, and David Boonin, understand the right to
abortion as a right of evacuation and not a right of termination. In Thomson’s
words,
While I am arguing for the permissibility of abortion in some cases, I am not
arguing for the right to secure the death of the preborn child. It is easy to
confuse these two things in that up to a certain point in the life of the foetus it
is not able to survive outside the mother’s body; hence removing it from her
body guarantees death. But they are importantly different.9
Along the same lines, Mary Anne Warren writes, “If and when a late-term
abortion could be safely performed without killing the fetus, [the mother] would
have no absolute right to insist on its death (e.g., if others wish to adopt it or pay for
its care), for the same reason that she does not have a right to insist that a viable
infant be killed.”10 Warren believes that the rights of the fetus to be in the womb do
not trump the woman’s right of freedom, which is violated by the pregnancy. How-
ever, if the fetus were removed and placed in an artificial womb, the rights of the
woman would no longer be violated. Likewise, in his book A Defense of Abortion,
David Boonin argues against abortion as termination:
[T]he claim that the woman has such a right [to terminate fetal life] would entail
that if the baby survived an attempted abortion, or was born prematurely, before
the woman had an opportunity to have the abortion performed, then she would
still have the right to have it killed. And this is plainly unacceptable. It may well
be true that many women who seek abortions do so because they want the fetus
8As cited by Nathanson in Aborting America, 179–180.
9Judith Jarvis Thomson, “A Defense of Abortion,” in Intervention and Reflection:
Basic Issues in Medical Ethics, 5th ed., ed. Ronald Munson (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth
Publishing Company, 1996), 79.
10Mary Anne Warren, “The Personhood Argument in Favor of Abortion,” in Life and
Death: A Reader in Moral Problems, ed. Louis P. Pojman (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth
Publishing Company, 2000), 267.
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that they are carrying to be killed. And such women will to that extent be dissat-
isfied with a position on which it is morally permissible for them to have their
viable fetuses extracted but not killed. But in the absence of an independent
reason to think that they are entitled to have the fetus die when it is already
viable, this seems to count more as a criticism of their desires than as an objec-
tion to the good samaritan argument.11
So these philosophers, the most prominent defenders of abortion, defend only
a right of evacuation, not a right of termination. Safe, practical artificial wombs
should therefore end the abortion debate for them. An added advantage, from their
perspective, would be that the right to evacuation abortion would be relatively, if not
absolutely, uncontested, unlike the present heavily contested abortions—heavily con-
tested because they include termination of the life of the human fetus.
The 1977 statement from the American College of Obstetricians and Gyne-
cologists implicitly raises an important objection, namely, that partial ectogenesis
(development of a baby outside the maternal womb for part of the gestational period)
could be more dangerous for the woman and therefore abortion as termination would
be preferable. In the words of David N. James:
A foetal transplant would be an elaborate surgical procedure aimed at the deli-
cate removal of the foetus from the mother’s placenta and its transfer and
attachment to the external artificial womb. Unlike an early abortion, foetal
transplantation would thus require general anesthesia as well as a surgical in-
cision through the abdominal wall and uterus, with all the risks of medical
complications which accompany these more invasive procedures.12
James also notes that intensive care for such children could be massively ex-
pensive and lead to many new orphanages, foster care homes, and related services.
These possible difficulties may or may not be realized. If these difficulties
were to take place, they would be technological, economic, or social difficulties and
not per se moral difficulties. Ex hypothesis, partial ectogenesis, as imagined in the
future, would not be dangerous for women. Many procedures that were dangerous
and invasive forty years ago are now safe and noninvasive. Many surgeries for-
merly requiring days in the hospital have become outpatient surgeries. The choice
between termination and extraction would not be the choice between no danger and
danger, but between two choices both risking dangers. As medical care advances, it
is highly likely that the differences in danger among the various procedures will be
negligible, and the cost for such treatments less expensive—as is seen, for example,
in the cheap, fast, and powerful computers of today, compared with the expensive,
slow, and not very powerful computers of the 1970s. Of course, a cataclysmic
disaster could return humanity to the Stone Age, but if the past is any indication of
11David Boonin, A Defense of Abortion (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
2003), 257. See also my review of Boonin’s book in the National Catholic Bioethics Quar-
terly 5.1 (Spring 2005): 199–202.
12David N. James, “Ectogenesis: A Reply to Singer and Wells,” Bioethics 1.1 (January
1987): 87.
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the future, the projected course of technological development strongly suggests that
the technological and economic problems that James foresees could be overcome.
The foreseen social cost of extraction rather than termination may also prove
to be mistaken. The countries most likely to use partial ectogenesis in lieu of abor-
tion are the same countries that will encounter underpopulation problems in the
near future—Western Europe and, to a lesser extent (due to immigration), the United
States. These countries will face severe financial difficulties in the future, with
fewer and fewer workers to support a growing class of retirees. For them, an
increase in the number of children and future workers may be a social boon, secur-
ing social support for seniors. Social considerations are not decisive arguments against
evacuation and the use of artificial wombs.
Of course, not all doctors, philosophers, or activists defending abortion under-
stand abortion rights in terms of evacuation rather than termination. For some, “abor-
tion rights” includes the right to secure the death of the human fetus. However, even
among advocates of infanticide, there is a recognition that insisting on fetal death in
the context of the availability of artificial wombs might be going too far. As Peter
Singer and Deane Wells wrote:
Freedom to choose what is to happen to one’s body is one thing; freedom to
insist on the death of a being that is capable of living outside of one’s body is
another. … [Even if there is no fetal right to life,] it is difficult to see why a
healthy foetus should die if there is someone who wishes to adopt it and will
give it the opportunity of a worthwhile life. We do not allow a mother to kill
her newborn baby because she does not wish either to keep it or to hand it over
for adoption. Unless we were to change our mind about this, it is difficult to
see why we should give this right to a woman in respect of a foetus she is
carrying, if her desire to be rid of the foetus can be fully satisfied without
threatening the life of the foetus.13
If consistent advocates of abortion and even infanticide such as Peter Singer
can embrace the use of advanced incubators in lieu of abortion, then it is likely that
there will be few advocates of abortion who will disagree. If advocates of abortion
such as these are consistent, and really meant what they have said about not desir-
ing the death of the human fetus, for at least these defenders of abortion, artificial
wombs would end the abortion debate.14
Artificial Wombs and Consistent Critics of Abortion
The most consistent and forceful critic of abortion in the modern world is the
Roman Catholic Church, so in accessing the acceptability of the use of artificial
wombs in lieu of abortion, I will make special reference to the Church’s official
13Peter Singer and Deane Wells, The Reproduction Revolution: New Ways of Mak-
ing Babies (Oxford, U.K.: Oxford University Press, 1984), 135–136.
14An interesting and related question concerns not intellectual defenses of abor-
tion, such as those given by Singer, Boonin, Thomson, Warren, and others, but the political
and social advocates of abortion. Here, the possibility of ending the debate is, I’m afraid,
much less likely, as is evident in some popular reflections on the topic, such as Zimmerman’s
“Fetal Position,” cited earlier.
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teaching on matters relevant to this question, especially Donum vitae. The Catholic
teaching on abortion is quite clear. In the words of John Paul II,
Given such unanimity in the doctrinal and disciplinary tradition of the Church,
Paul VI was able to declare that this tradition is unchanged and unchangeable.
Therefore, by the authority which Christ conferred upon Peter and his Succes-
sors, in communion with the Bishops—who on various occasions have con-
demned abortion and who in the aforementioned consultation, albeit dispersed
throughout the world, have shown unanimous agreement concerning this doc-
trine—I declare that direct abortion, that is, abortion willed as an end or as
a means, always constitutes a grave moral disorder, since it is the deliberate
killing of an innocent human being.15
What I believe is not clear (indeed, has never to my knowledge been explicitly
addressed) is the Catholic answer to the question of the moral permissibility of artifi-
cial wombs in lieu of abortion. However, Catholic teaching does provide principles
that could be applied to this case. Indeed, although the magisterium may at some
point in the future explicitly address this situation, several important arguments against
artificial wombs from magisterial teaching should be acknowledged, namely, (1) the
artificiality objection, (2) the IVF objection, (3) the embryo transfer objection, (4) the
deprivation of maternal shelter objection, (5) the birth-within-marriage objection,
(6) the integrative parenthood objection, (7) the surrogate motherhood objection,
and finally, (8) the wrongful experimentation objection.16  Each objection to artificial
wombs arises from the Catholic tradition and has some plausibility. However, I be-
lieve that each objection fails and that there are compelling reasons to conclude that
the use of artificial wombs in lieu of abortion is morally permissible.
I should first clarify a number of key terms in the discussion. By complete
ectogenesis, I mean the generation and development of a human being outside the
womb from the beginning of embryonic existence until the equivalent of forty weeks’
gestation. By partial ectogenesis, I mean the development of a human being during
the typical gestational period outside the maternal womb for part of (but not the
entire) gestational period. An artificial womb might be used for complete or partial
ectogenesis; i.e, it could be used to generate and sustain development of an embryo
or fetus during the entire period of gestation, or it might be used to sustain develop-
ment after partial development within the maternal womb. Embryo transfer moves
the human embryo, having never been planted in a womb, to another location, such
as an artificial womb or maternal womb. Fetal transfer moves the fetus from a
maternal womb to another maternal womb or to an artificial womb. So, let us now
consider some of the likely objections to artificial wombs.
15John Paul II, Evangelium vitae (March 25, 1995), n. 62.
16These objections make more explicit, both in terms of content and linkage to the
Catholic tradition, many of the concerns voiced by Christine Rosen in her important ar-
ticle “Why Not Artificial Wombs?” appearing in The New Atlantis 3 (Fall 2003): 67–76.
Although I ultimately disagree with Rosen, the concerns she raises are both legitimate and
reasonable, although in my view ultimately not persuasive.
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(1) The artificiality objection. This possible objection against artificial wombs
arises precisely because these wombs are artificial. As utilizing an artificial, man-
made product for the purpose of gestation, ectogenesis of any kind would be against
nature. Since human beings should act in accordance with nature, artificial wombs
are impermissible.
However, the “artificiality” of such wombs is not sufficient grounds for reject-
ing their use. In speaking of various technologies used to create human life, such as
IVF, Donum vitae indicates that
[t]hese interventions are not to be rejected on the grounds that they are artificial.
As such, they bear witness to the possibilities of the art of medicine. But they
must be given a moral evaluation in reference to the dignity of the human per-
son, who is called to realize his vocation from God to the gift of love and the gift
of life.17
Indeed, current advanced incubators are highly “artificial,” making use of cutting-
edge technology of all kinds, but they are not ethically impermissible. Indeed, the
artificial wombs envisioned by researchers are nothing more than extremely ad-
vanced versions of incubators routinely used today.
One can fairly easily imagine artificial wombs that would be acceptable to
everyone. Imagine a woman greatly desiring to have children who discovers she has
uterine cancer and must have her uterus removed in order to save her life. If the
research of Hung-Ching Liu is successful, portions of a woman’s healthy uterine
tissue could be used to fashion an artificial uterus for her that could be reimplanted
into her own body, restoring her fertility. If successful, her womb would be “artifi-
cial,” fashioned by human hands outside the human body and using advanced tech-
nology, yet presumably no more morally problematic than an artificial heart.
(2) The IVF objection. This objection against artificial wombs arises from the
Catholic opposition to IVF. The Catholic Church, it would seem, must oppose
ectogenesis because it would seem to presuppose the use of cloning, parthenogen-
esis, or IVF in creating an embryo. In the words of Donum vitae,
attempts or hypotheses for obtaining a human being without any connection
with sexuality through “twin fission,” cloning or parthenogenesis are to be
considered contrary to the moral law, since they are in opposition to the dig-
nity both of human procreation and of the conjugal union. … Such fertilization
(IVF) is in itself illicit and in opposition to the dignity of procreation and of
the conjugal union, even when everything is done to avoid the death of the
human embryo.18
If ectogenesis is wrong, and the use of artificial wombs in lieu of abortion is a form of
ectogenesis, our question has been answered.
However, this objection fails to distinguish between partial ectogenesis and
complete ectogenesis. Catholic teaching as expressed in Donum vitae clearly ex-
17Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, Donum vitae, Introduction, 3 (origi-
nal emphasis).
18Ibid., I.6. and II.B.5. (emphasis removed).
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cludes complete ectogenesis (because the document forbids fertilization outside the
human body), but a condemnation of complete ectogenesis is not decisive for the
question at issue, since the use of artificial wombs in lieu of abortion would be
considered partial ectogenesis. A woman tempted to seek abortion already has a
human fetus within her. Complete ectogenesis is already excluded. Partial
ectogenesis is the continued development of an already generated human being in
an artificial womb after transfer from a maternal womb. By definition, partial
ectogenesis does not involve generation and development entirely outside the womb.
So although the Catholic Church opposes IVF, twin fission, cloning, and partheno-
genesis, and must therefore oppose complete ectogenesis, it does not necessarily
follow that it would oppose partial ectogenesis.
(3) The embryo transfer objection. This possible objection arises from the
belief of impermissibility of embryo transfer (ET). If embryo transfer is impermis-
sible, fetal transfer (FT) from a maternal womb to an artificial womb would also
seem to be impermissible. Partial ectogenesis necessarily involves FT, the transfer of
the human fetus from the maternal womb to an artificial womb, and so partial
ectogenesis would seem to be impermissible.
It is important to note that embryo transfer has not been explicitly condemned
by the Catholic Church. Indeed, the previous issue of the National Catholic Bioeth-
ics Quarterly (Spring 2005) devoted several articles to the topic, which were writ-
ten from various perspectives and came to different conclusions. In the condemna-
tion of embryo transfer in Donum vitae, the problematic nature of embryo transfer
is always spoken of in connection with IVF. It could be that IVF and ET are objec-
tionable as a combination, and yet ET alone is not wrong ex objecto. Donum
vitae condemns IVF and excludes implantation of an embryo into a surrogate mother,
but the document does not explicitly condemn the reimplantation of an embryo which
has been created through IVF into the genetic mother’s womb. Indeed, many au-
thors argue that the “rescue” of abandoned frozen embryos via implantation, even
into adoptive mothers, is permissible, indeed heroic.19
A final case may make clear the acceptability of embryo transfer. In treating
ectopic pregnancy, some doctors have removed the embryo from the fallopian tube
and implanted the embryo in the mother’s uterus. There have been reports of suc-
cessful pregnancies resulting. Surely, such efforts to preserve the health of the mother
and secure the life of the embryo are not only permissible but laudable. At least in
such cases, the moving of the embryo to avoid potentially lethal harm to the mother
and certainly lethal harm to the child is clearly permissible. If ET is not wrong ex
19In addition to the articles in the Spring 2005 edition of the National Catholic
Bioethics Quarterly, also see Mary Geach and Helen Watt’s debate of the question, “Are
There Any Circumstances in Which It Would Be Morally Admirable for a Woman to Seek
to Have an Orphan Embryo Implanted in her Womb?” in Issues for a Catholic Bioethic:
Proceedings of the International Conference to Celebrate the Twentieth Anniversary
of the Foundation of the Linacre Centre, 28–31 July 1997, ed. Luke Gormally (London:
The Linacre Centre, 1999), 341–352; Helen Watt, “A Brief Defense of Frozen Embryo
Adoption,” National Catholic Bioethics Quarterly 1.2 (Summer 2001): 151–154.
THE NATIONAL CATHOLIC BIOETHICS QUARTERLY \ SUMMER 2005
292
objecto, then it would seem that transfer of a human being prior to full term from
one location to another is not in itself impermissible—which is what is required for
partial ectogenesis.
However, even if ET were unacceptable ex objecto, it does not necessarily
follow that FT is problematic. Indeed, fetal transfer is already widely practiced and
accepted. The emergency cesarean delivery of a preterm baby in danger of dying is
not morally problematic, and may, in some cases, even be morally obligatory. As
incubator technology progresses, some premature babies who now are seriously
injured or who die because of preterm delivery will instead become viable and healthy.
(4) The deprivation of maternal shelter objection. This objection is more
difficult. In the words of Donum vitae,
The freezing of embryos, even when carried out in order to preserve the life of
an embryo—cryopreservation—constitutes an offense against the respect due
to human beings by exposing them to grave risks of death or harm to their
physical integrity, and depriving them, at least temporarily, of maternal shel-
ter and gestation, thus placing them in a situation in which further offenses
and manipulation are possible.20
In justifying the conclusion that it is wrong to freeze human embryos, the document
appeals to the impermissibility of depriving the human embryo of maternal shelter
and gestation. Partial ectogenesis necessarily involves the deprivation of maternal
shelter and gestation, and so the use of artificial wombs would seem to be objection-
able.
It is possible, however, that deprivation of maternal shelter and gestation is prima
facie wrong, but nevertheless may be justified in certain circumstances. Consider the
case of a viable baby whose mother begins to die, or actually dies. Surgeons on-hand
rush to remove the premature baby from the mother, depriving him or her of maternal
gestation—but of course this removal is not in itself morally objectionable. One can
imagine other situations in which a preborn child must be removed from the uterus or
else he or she will die, such as a case of a mother who has an incompetent uterus, or a
situation in which the mother has been poisoned, and the poison will kill the child
unless it is immediately removed from the womb. In these cases, removing the child
from the maternal womb does no offense to the dignity of the child. Maternal gestation
and shelter are important to the human being in utero to the extent that they aid and
support the well-being of the human fetus. In cases in which it endangers the life of a
human being to remain in utero, depriving a human fetus of maternal gestation is not
morally objectionable, but may be morally praiseworthy.
Of course, all the cases appealed to in the previous paragraph involve medical
pathology threatening fetal life rather than a free choice of the will. If natural causes
endanger the life of the human fetus, then removal is permissible and deprivation of
maternal gestation does not offend the dignity of the human being in utero. On the
other hand, if the life of the human fetus is threatened by the choice of abortion,
20Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, Donum vitae I.6 (original emphasis
removed, new emphasis added).
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deprivation of maternal gestation is blameworthy. Depriving the human being in
utero of care and shelter may be permissible in the first case of natural causes, but
not permissible in the second case, in which the danger to the child is voluntarily
caused and could be voluntarily removed.
Does the voluntary or involuntary nature of the danger mark a morally deci-
sive difference between the two cases? Whether the danger is voluntarily or
nonvoluntarily caused makes no difference from the perspective of the preborn who
are threatened with death. Death is just as final from a voluntary cause as from a
nonvoluntary cause. Indeed, many causes of danger to the human fetus which could
be considered “natural” can be originally caused by voluntary actions. For example,
one can imagine a case in which a pregnant woman is dying because she was in a
car accident that she caused by her irresponsible driving, or perhaps a case in which
a woman is dying from lung cancer because she smoked too many cigarettes. The
details of a causal chain which ends with a human fetus being in danger of death
unless removed from the womb do not, therefore, appear to be morally decisive in
determining the permissibility of the use of highly advanced incubators.
Another important distinction between the two cases (partial ectogenesis in-
stead of abortion on the one hand, and on the other hand, fetal removal on account
of a maternal pathology threatening fetal well-being) is that in the first case, the
removal is motivated by the (perceived) well-being of the mother, but in the second,
the removal is motivated by the well-being of the child. Perhaps this difference could
account for the impermissibility of the first act but the clear permissibility of the
second.
However, there are other cases, not normally viewed as problematic, in which
the removal of the child takes place for the well-being of the woman. In the case of a
gravid cancerous uterus, the removal of uterus and child takes place to preserve the
mother’s, not the child’s, well-being. According to widely accepted understandings
of double effect reasoning, the removal of the gravid cancerous uterus is morally
permissible even if the premature child would die. If fetal viability has already been
achieved, the removal is even easier to justify. For a variety of reasons, some of
which are legitimate and will be discussed below, many women choose to have labor
induced so as to deliver their babies before their due date. It seems that there is tacit
agreement that such practices are morally unproblematic so long as the safety of the
mother and child is not endangered. Some women have labor induced because they
have had extremely rapid labors in the past and want to make sure they deliver with
proper medical care available; others due to their discomfort near the end of preg-
nancy; still others for reasons entirely unrelated to physical well-being, such as the
preference for a certain date of birth for their child. None of these practices is
impermissible. If ectogenesis can function in the future as currently envisioned, then
induction of labor or surgical removal of the human fetus at any stage of pregnancy
could become no less dangerous than induction of labor is now with contemporary
technology a few days before the due date. In such circumstances, whatever would
justify delivering a child a few days earlier would also justify ectogenesis.
This arguably proves too much, for even if partial ectogenesis might be per-
missible in lieu of abortion, it seems prima facie morally problematic to choose par-
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tial ectogenesis for trivial reasons. One might then carve out a “middle position”
such that partial ectogenesis ought not to be used for utterly trivial reasons, and yet
may be chosen in circumstances in which a person might otherwise be tempted to
choose abortion. It would be difficult, if not impossible, to detail all the circum-
stances. However, one might liken the use of partial ectogenesis to adoption gener-
ally. It would be wrong to place a child into another family by adoption simply be-
cause the child’s birthday fell on the “wrong” day or because one did not want to
suffer other such trivial inconveniences. On the other hand, adoption in other cir-
cumstances, such as a broken relationship between the father and mother, could be
fully permissible. Generally, the bond between mother and child should not be bro-
ken, but given appropriate circumstances, both adoption as we now know it and
partial ectogenesis as it has been imagined here can be permissible despite under-
mining the natural mother-child bond.
(5) The birth-within-marriage objection. The right of a child to be born
within marriage is another objection that could be raised to the use of highly ad-
vanced incubators in the context of possible abortion. In the words of Donum vitae,
Techniques of fertilization in vitro can open the way to other forms of biological
and genetic manipulation of human embryos, such as attempts or plans for
fertilization between human and animal gametes and the gestation of human
embryos in the uterus of animals, or the hypothesis or project of constructing
artificial uteruses for the human embryo. These procedures are contrary to the
human dignity proper to the embryo, and at the same time they are contrary to
the right of every person to be conceived and to be born within marriage and
from marriage.21
This passage is particularly noteworthy in that it explicitly mentions the possibility of
constructing artificial uteruses and seems to condemn ectogenesis.
Indeed, this passage of Donum vitae clearly indicates the moral impermissibil-
ity of complete ectogenesis, but it does not necessarily exclude partial ectogenesis.
Whenever the human fetus leaves his or her mother’s womb, whether by surgical
intervention or naturally, whether at full term or earlier, a human being can rightly be
said to be born. Unlike complete ectogenesis, condemned by this passage, partial
ectogenesis takes place after human birth, albeit a preterm, surgically initiated human
birth. Hence, partial ectogenesis is simply not within the scope of this passage from
Donum vitae, which discusses the right to be born within marriage.
(6) The integrative parenthood objection. Donum vitae does, however, clarify
the meaning of the right to be born within marriage in the following passage, in ways
that would seem to also exclude partial ectogenesis. Call this the integrative parent-
hood objection to partial ectogenesis. “The child has the right to be conceived, car-
ried in the womb, brought into the world and brought up within marriage: it is
through the secure and recognized relationship to his own parents that the child can
discover his own identity and achieve his own proper human development.”22 Artificial
21Ibid., I.6 (original emphasis).
22Ibid., II. A. 1 (emphasis added).
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insemination using egg or sperm from someone outside the marriage is also imper-
missible for the same reason:
Heterologous artificial fertilization violates the rights of the child; it deprives him
of his filial relationship with his parental origins and can hinder the maturing of
his personal identity. Furthermore, it offends the common vocation of the spouses
who are called to fatherhood and motherhood: it objectively deprives conjugal
fruitfulness of its unity and integrity; it brings about and manifests a rupture
between genetic parenthood, gestational parenthood and responsibility for up-
bringing.23
At first glance, these passages seem to clearly exclude partial ectogenesis as
undermining gestational parenthood, which is important in securing the well-being
of the child. Integrative parenthood involves not separating genetic parenthood, ges-
tational parenthood, and what might be called social parenthood, namely, the respon-
sibility for raising and rearing the child. A child has a right to integrative parenthood,
and even partial ectogenesis violates this right by depriving the human fetus of gesta-
tional parenthood.
However, this interpretation of the importance of integrative parenthood can-
not be maintained. If a right to be conceived, gestated, and raised within marriage
were understood to mean that every child once conceived must be brought up within
marriage, it would follow that all women who find themselves pregnant outside of
marriage (even by rape) must marry the father. In many cases of extramarital preg-
nancy, marriage of the father and mother constitutes the best response to the situa-
tion. However, marriage following pregnancy is not always advisable, let alone a
moral duty. Indeed, in at least some cases of extramarital pregnancy, marriage not
only would be gravely imprudent but indeed is not permissible or even possible, such
as when a pregnancy occurs as the result of incest, when a prior valid marriage exists
for one or both parties, or when a pregnancy involves a party of very young age.
In addition, if the right to integrative parenthood were interpreted as the right
of every existing child to be nurtured in his or her mother’s womb until full-term birth
and then raised in a marriage, then every birth mother placing a child for adoption
and every couple accepting a child for adoption would be acting impermissibly. Of
course, given appropriate circumstances, birth parents and adoptive parents do noth-
ing wrong in their acts of giving and receiving a child. Indeed, a birth mother acts
generously and bravely in placing her child in another family through adoption. When
adoption is in the child’s best interest, the birth mother performs a loving and heroic
act and those who adopt the child likewise perform a generous act. Donum vitae
itself notes that adoption is an important service to life: “Physical sterility in fact can
be for spouses the occasion for other important services to the life of the human
person, for example, adoption, various forms of educational work, and assistance to
other families and to poor or handicapped children.”24  A child’s right to integrative
parenthood is misinterpreted if this right would lead to a condemnation of adoption.
23Ibid., II. A. 2.
24Ibid., II. B. 8.
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Integrative parenthood should be understood as the belief that one should not
cause a human being to come into existence unless one can properly care for the
child. A child’s right to integrative parenthood means that parents should not set out
to conceive a child unless there is a marriage of the child’s mother and father,
conception by mother and father in the act of marriage, and the intention to nurture
the child within the maternal womb and then raise the child within marriage. How-
ever, once conception of a new human being has taken place, inside of marriage
or outside, it is in certain circumstances permissible, and even praiseworthy, to choose
adoption, if this option is judged by sound prudential judgment to be in the best
interest of the individual child. Although it would be wrong to conceive a child simply
in order to place him or her for adoption, the Catholic Church’s teaching and ongoing
support of adoption makes it clear that it is not wrong to choose adoption following
the conception of a child. Whether this adoption takes place at a few weeks after
birth, at forty weeks of full gestation, at twenty-five weeks following conception on
account of premature birth, or at seven weeks following conception does not, in
itself, seem morally relevant, so long as the well-being of the child is not endangered.
The right to integrative parenthood does not exclude adoption and would seem also
not to exclude partial ectogenesis.
(7) The surrogate motherhood objection. This objection would describe
ectogenesis as a form of surrogate motherhood. Donum vitae clearly teaches that
surrogate motherhood is ethically impermissible:
Surrogate motherhood represents an objective failure to meet the obligations
of maternal love, of conjugal fidelity and of responsible motherhood; it of-
fends the dignity and the right of the child to be conceived, carried in the
womb, brought into the world and brought up by his own parents; it sets up, to
the detriment of families, a division between the physical, psychological and
moral elements which constitute those families.25
If surrogate motherhood is wrong, and if ectogenesis is a form of surrogate
motherhood, indeed an artificial surrogate motherhood, then ectogenesis would also
be wrong. This might be called the surrogate motherhood objection to the use of
highly advanced incubators in lieu of abortion.
In response, one should recall the very precise definition of surrogate mother-
hood given in Donum vitae:
By “surrogate mother,” the instruction means:
(a) The woman who carries in pregnancy an embryo implanted in her uterus and
who is genetically a stranger to the embryo because it has been obtained through
the union of the gametes of “donors.” She carries the pregnancy with a pledge
to surrender the baby once it is born to the party who commissioned or made the
agreement for the pregnancy.
(b) The woman who carries in pregnancy an embryo to whose procreation she
has contributed the donation of her own ovum, fertilized through insemination
with the sperm of a man other than her husband. She carries the pregnancy with
25Ibid., II. A. 3.
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a pledge to surrender the child once it is born to the party who commissioned or
made the agreement for the pregnancy.26
By neither of these definitions would partial ectogenesis be a form of surro-
gate motherhood. Both definitions of surrogate motherhood involve promises made
by the surrogate mother to give up the baby once it is born to whomever commis-
sioned or made the agreement for pregnancy. Obviously, an artificial womb cannot
pledge or agree to anything, nor must partial ectogenesis involve giving the baby to
those who initiated creation of the baby. Indeed, in cases where partial ectogenesis
is chosen instead of abortion, the woman who otherwise would have chosen abor-
tion does not want to raise the baby. In sum, one can reject the permissibility of
surrogate motherhood as understood in Donum vitae without rejecting the permis-
sibility of using highly advanced incubators in lieu of abortion.
(8) The wrongful experimentation objection. Finally, that this solution to the
abortion problem might involve wrongful experimentation is perhaps the most pow-
erful objection to partial ectogenesis. Pope John Paul II writes in Evangelium vitae,
This [negative] evaluation of the morality of abortion is to be applied also to
the recent forms of intervention on human embryos which, although carried
out for purposes legitimate in themselves, inevitably involve the killing of
those embryos. This is the case with experimentation on embryos, which is
becoming increasingly widespread in the field of biomedical research and is
legally permitted in some countries. Although “one must uphold as licit pro-
cedures carried out on the human embryo which respect the life and integrity
of the embryo and do not involve disproportionate risks for it, but rather are
directed to its healing, the improvement of its condition of health, or its indi-
vidual survival,” it must nonetheless be stated that the use of human embryos
or fetuses as an object of experimentation constitutes a crime against their
dignity as human beings who have a right to the same respect owed to a child
once born, just as to every person.27
If scientific experimentation on human beings before birth is only permissible
when directed to the healing or sustaining of the well-being of the individual not yet
born, then to attempt partial ectogenesis would be wrong. The use of artificial wombs
in lieu of abortion subject the human fetus to risks, not for the sake of the human
fetus’s own welfare, but for the sake of the mother being free from pregnancy.
Although some day techniques of partial ectogenesis may be made eventually routine
and no more risky than normal pregnancy, all early attempts at partial ectogenesis
would be wrongful experimentation.
However, as others have pointed out, ectogenesis could be developed as an
extension of saving premature babies (as Thomas Schaffer hopes to do with his
synthetic amniotic fluid, as described at the beginning of this article). Experimental
procedures undertaken to save the life of premature infants are fully acceptable given
the principles suggested by John Paul II, since they would be directed towards the
individual survival of the human beings in question. If these techniques were im-
26Ibid., II. A. 3., asterisk footnote.
27John Paul II, Evangelium vitae, n. 63 (internal quote is from Donum vitae I.3.).
THE NATIONAL CATHOLIC BIOETHICS QUARTERLY \ SUMMER 2005
298
proved over time by means of this type of acceptable experimentation, the sustain-
ing of very young human fetuses outside the womb would eventually no longer be
experimental but could become a common procedure, exposing its human subjects
to no disproportionate risks. Partial ectogenesis may someday become less risky
than normal gestation, since an artificial womb would not, presumably, get into car
crashes, slip and fall, or be assaulted. Accepting that experimentation should only be
undertaken for the good of the one experimented upon does not exclude the legiti-
mate development of artificial wombs, if these artificial wombs are developed in the
process of trying to save premature infants who would otherwise die. For the many
couples experiencing painful premature deliveries due to an incompetent uterus,
such technology would be a great blessing.
Having examined the artificiality objection, the IVF objection, the embryo trans-
fer objection, the deprivation of maternal shelter objection, the birth-within-marriage
objection, the integrative parenthood objection, the surrogate motherhood objection,
and finally the wrongful experimentation objection, I can find no basis in Catholic
magisterial teaching as presently articulated for the condemnation of the use of artifi-
cial wombs in lieu of abortion.
Doubtless there are objections and sources that could be brought to bear on this
question that could lead to a different conclusion. However, even if it were to turn
out that Catholic principles did lead to the moral impermissibility of highly advanced
incubators in place of abortion, partial ectogenesis still might be counselled as the
lesser of two evils in situations in which a woman is determined to end her preg-
nancy. In cases in which an agent is determined to do wrong, it is permissible to
counsel him or her to do the lesser of two evils.28  If an agent is intent on harming an
innocent person as an act of “revenge,” and will not be deterred despite one’s best
efforts, one can counsel the agent to do less harm rather than more. When compar-
ing abortion to the use of artificial wombs, an extermination to an extraction, it is
clear that abortion involves a more serious evil, since abortion involves a more seri-
ous harm to the preborn, the intentional taking of human life, and partial ectogenesis,
even if morally problematic, does not involve harms that are as serious. Thus, even if
artificial wombs are morally impermissible considered in themselves, their use might
still be urged in lieu of abortion, if a woman was determined to terminate her preg-
nancy in one way or another, as it seems is often the case.
Thus far, I have sought to remove reasonable but ultimately, I believe, mis-
taken objections to partial ectogenesis based on magisterial Catholic teaching. I
have not addressed the positive case for limited use of partial ectogenesis. The most
obvious answer is that artificial wombs could save innocent human lives. In the year
2000 alone, there were approximately 1.31 million abortions in the United States,29
28John Finnis, Moral Absolutes: Tradition, Revision, and Truth (Washington, DC:
The Catholic University of America Press, 1991), 98, note 33.
29Lawrence B. Finer and Stanley K. Henshaw, “Abortion Incidence and Services in
the United States in 2000,” Perspectives on Sexual and Reproductive Health 35.1 (Janu-
ary/February 2003): 6–15.
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and in 1995, it is estimated that there were approximately 46 million abortions world-
wide.30  If only a small percentage of abortions were eliminated by the use of artifi-
cial wombs, this would be a great service to the human community. Like orphanages
long sponsored by the Church, support of highly advanced incubators would help
preserve the well-being of innocent preborn human persons who otherwise would
be lost.
Artificial wombs could also be a great aid to couples facing infertility prob-
lems. Even aside from the abortion issue, such advanced incubators could help
married couples who experience repeated miscarriages, due to maternal health prob-
lems, various kinds of maternal-fetal incompatibility, or other pathologies. Imagine,
for example, if the work of Hung-Ching Liu described above were successful. A
woman whose uterus had to be removed because of cancer could have an artificial
womb constructed from those cancer-free sections of her own uterine lining and
then have this artificial uterus transplanted in her body, facilitating “normal” concep-
tion, gestation, and birth. Like heart or kidney transplants, such medical advances
would be welcomed by the Church as morally unproblematic. If an artificial womb
could permissibly be used within a woman’s body, it is difficult to see why it could
not permissibly be used outside a woman’s body.
Additionally, while some people allege that the Church’s teaching on abortion
arises from an explicit or implicit desire to subjugate women by “tying them down”
to children and pregnancy, in fact the teaching arises from an affirmation of the
equality and dignity of every single human being, male or female, born or preborn.
Support for partial ectogenesis in lieu of abortion would make this crystal clear to all.
It is care and concern for the well-being of all human beings that leads to a condem-
nation of abortion, and the same care and concern leads to the approval of highly
advanced incubators in lieu of abortion. There is no denying that the foreseen effects
of giving live birth in cases of crisis pregnancy are characteristically much more
difficult for the women involved than for the men. Not choosing abortion may be
quite challenging, calling those involved to heroic generosity. The Church as an
institution makes a tremendous effort to lessen the difficulties borne uniquely by
women in such crisis pregnancy situations, by offering homes to mothers in need,
providing child care, and making available other material and spiritual assistance.
Many dioceses in the United States offer virtually full support to any woman facing a
crisis pregnancy. Support of partial ectogenesis would be an extension of these ef-
forts to make less difficult the burdens placed uniquely on pregnant women.
A thought experiment may make the acceptability of artificial wombs in this
situation more clear. Imagine that scientists had discovered an injection that sped up
the time of gestation. Rather than a full nine months of pregnancy, a woman who
received this injection would give birth to a full term, perfectly healthy baby just nine
minutes later. Imagine further that the injection was no more risky for mothers and
their babies than normal gestation and childbirth. Would use of such injections be
acceptable and welcomed according to Catholic teaching?
30Stanley K. Henshaw, Susheela Singh, and Taylor Haas, “The Incidence of Abortion
Worldwide,” International Family Planning Perspectives 25.6 Suppl. (1999): S30–S38.
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I believe that the answer would be yes. Although these injections would not be
“natural,” they would be no more contrary to nature, or wrong in a moral sense, than
pain medication to ease the agony of labor. Rather than enduring morning sickness,
interruption of educational or work schedules, and other hardships associated with a
full nine months of pregnancy, a woman would be able to forgo these difficulties, if
she chose, without endangering the well-being of the child in question. A woman
who might otherwise be tempted to choose abortion rather than adoption (due to the
long months of bonding with the child, making adoption later extremely difficult)
would be able to place her baby with a family before extensive bonding occurred.
Many who turn to abortion out of shame and fear of condemnation by others could
speed up the gestation and deliver before anyone found out. Victims of rape impreg-
nated by their attackers would not have to be reminded for nine months of their
sexual assault. If such an injection existed, many women would be helped; the lives
of many children preserved. All these considerations apply equally well to the use of
artificial wombs as an alternative to abortion.31
In the minds of many, and I count myself no exception, the phrases “partial
ectogenesis” and “artificial wombs” conjure images of Huxley’s Brave New World or
scenes from Star Wars: Attack of the Clones. I think of bizarre technology put to evil
use. However, what we are talking about is no more ominous, bizarre, or evil than
highly advanced versions of the incubators widely used today in hospitals to save the
lives of thousands of premature infants. Like any technology, one can imagine the
possibility of abuses, but the same thing is true of very primitive technologies such as
fire and knives. The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention reported that during
2002 alone, there were 480,812 babies born prematurely (before thirty-seven weeks)
in the United States, more than 12 percent of all births that year.32  Although caring
for these children is currently very expensive and many of them become seriously
disabled, we can hope that these drawbacks might be lessened or eliminated in the
future. In other words, we have primitive artificial wombs and stone-age partial
ectogenesis right now—and they are accepted by everyone. The use of technologi-
cally advanced incubators in lieu of abortion is therefore morally permissible, espe-
cially when the other likely alternative ends with a dead child and a wounded woman.
An End to the Abortion Debate?
Important public debates do not end when there is not a single person left on a
given side of an issue, but rather when the vast majority of both sides comes to a
 31I do not wish to defend the view that artificial wombs may be used for any reason
whatsoever, but rather to propose the more modest point that in situations in which a woman
would otherwise have an abortion, they would be permissible. The detailing of circum-
stances in which they would be permissible falls outside the scope of my discussion. It
may be, as mentioned earlier, that although the use of artificial wombs is not intrinsically
evil, their use should be limited to relatively restricted circumstances, much as adoption,
although not intrinsically evil, is not permissible for frivolous reasons.
32Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, National Center for Health Statis-
tics, Fast Stats A to Z, “Birthweight and Gestation” (2002), http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/fastats/
birthwt.htm.
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consensus. As noted in the first section of this article, the vast majority of defenders
of abortion who have written about the topic in scholarly journals and books do not
defend a right of extermination but rather the right of extraction. The termination of
pregnancy, and not the termination of human life, is their stated goal. If they are
consistent with what they have written, it would seem that the vast majority of these
people could accept the use of artificial wombs in lieu of abortion. It was then
argued that the foremost opponent of abortion in the modern world, the Catholic
Church, has not condemned artificial wombs in lieu of abortion and has strong rea-
son to support their use. If this is correct, then both consistent defenders and consis-
tent critics of abortion could accept the permissibility of using artificial wombs in lieu
of abortion. Of course, in this article, I have considered only a relatively small aspect
of the “abortion debate,” namely, the intellectual debate, without taking into consid-
eration its social, legal, and political aspects. Even if the use of artificial wombs
could placate the “intellectuals” on both sides of the matter, whether the use of
artificial uteruses instead of abortion would also satisfy what Alasdair MacIntyre
has called “plain persons” is a different matter. Nevertheless, although many scien-
tific, social, legal, and economic hurdles remain, the day may come when, thanks to
the use of artificial wombs, the abortion debate is as settled and distant as debates
over slavery are today.33
33Special thanks to my student Avi Wizenfeld, who worked with me doing research
for this article. Thanks also to Fr. Michael Sherwin, O.P., who kindly invited me to give a
version of this paper to the Dominicans at the Albertinum/L’Ancienne Académie in Fribourg,
Switzerland.
